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he Psychology of Good Character
Alice Woolley 1 and Jocelyn Stacey 2
I. Introduction
Defying the improbability of time-travel, Dr. K, a forensic psychiatrist working in
Toronto, Ontario in the 1990s, meets Justice H, the Chief Justice of British
Columbia in the late 1940s. They meet to discuss the possible admission to a
law society of Mr. P, who in 1994 falsified his resume and transcripts in applying
for an articling position. In particular, they are there to determine whether Mr. P
is of “good character”. To begin the discussion each makes an opening
statement about what they think is primarily relevant to determining the character
of the applicant and his possible admission to the bar:
Dr. K: “Behaviour flows from character. In 1994, the applicant displayed
bad behaviour from which an inference could be drawn about bad
character. In 1999, the applicant displayed good behaviour. The
question [is] whether this was the result of a conscious decision on the
part of the applicant to change his behaviour without an underlying change
in character (in which case, his earlier behaviour was related to transient
factors), or whether that good behaviour flowed from the applicant’s bad
character as yet unchanged.”3
Chief Justice H: “The law student's training is not manual training, but is
training of the mind, not only in law, but if he wishes to be something more
than a mere legal mechanic, he must study logic, history, in particular
constitutional history, political science and economics, a certain amount of
philosophy and acquire a reasonable familiarity with English literature, and
know something at least of the literature of other countries. The object
of law training is to attract young men of high character, and to train them
in a manner that they will be trustworthy, honourable and competent in the
performance of their legal duties, and will use such influence as they have
to maintain and improve but not destroy our Canadian constitutional
democracy”4
In reading this exchange one could reasonably enough wonder whether Dr. K
and Chief Justice H will ever find common ground, or even be able to recognize
each other as talking about the same thing. Yet both these statements were
made (though not made to each other) in the application of a common legal
standard: whether an applicant for law society admission is of “good character”.
This paper explores the significance of the changing nature of the good character
requirement for law society admission. It posits that good character has shifted
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2
from a philosophical concept – a “cultural project”5 of professionalism – into a
psychological concept, with evidence of past bad acts claimed to be relevant for
whether an applicant represents a future risk to the public. 6 We suggest,
however, that this shifting conception of character has been only partial, and that
the decision-making processes of Canadian law societies have not kept pace
with it. Instead, the decision-making process defines character generally and
generically, with only occasional emphasis on character as a relevant predictor of
future behaviour. In addition, law societies only rarely employ psychological
evidence 7 in their decision-making processes, and when they do employ such
evidence they seem uncertain as to its relevance and utility.
Finally, this paper explores whether law societies should embrace a more overt
recognition of character as a psychological concept. Whether law societies
should make determinations of character similarly to other legal contexts in which
the relevant legal standard is psychological – what custody decision is in the
“best interests” of the child and whether an offender is “dangerous.” We review
how psychological evidence is used in the context of determinations of custody
and dangerousness, and the success (or, as it turns out, the failure) of
psychological evidence as an aid to fair and accurate decision-making in those
circumstances. In the end, the paper concludes that while treating good
character as a psychological standard is the only way to make the requirement
logical and justifiable in light of the purposes it is said to fulfill, the employment of
a psychological standard is fraught with difficulty. There is, in the end, no reason
to believe that a psychology based approach will lead to more coherent and fair
decision-making. Given that, and given the significant issues with a nonpsychological concept of character, the case for retaining a good character
requirement for bar admission is weak.
II. The Changing Conception of Character
The requirement that Canadian lawyers be of “good character” has existed since
the advent of any formal regulation of the profession. For example, the first legal
standards for those seeking to act as lawyers within the North-West Territories
were established in December 1885 by the Lieutenant-Governor. Other than
lawyers who were already admitted to the bar or had practiced in another of the
“Queen’s Dominions,” anyone seeking enrollment as an advocate had to be of
“good character”. In 1888 these rules were expanded to require anyone seeking
enrollment as an advocate (whether admitted elsewhere or not) to establish his
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good character.8 When the Law Society of Alberta was created in 1907, “A letter
of good character was the entrance fee.”9
The good character requirement continues to apply to admission to provincial law
societies of all prospective Canadian lawyers. All applicants must provide some
documentation in support of their good character (letters of reference) and, as
well, must disclose information related to past “bad acts” which might, in the law
societies’ view, be indicative of bad character.10
Is today’s good character requirement oriented at fundamentally the same thing
as that which concerned the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories in
1888 when he required that all those seeking enrollment be of good character?
Answering this question requires identifying what good character would have
meant in that earlier time frame: what, for example, would the original 144
members of the Law Society of Alberta in 1907 have understood to be
encompassed by the requirement that they provide a letter of good character as
the price of admission? What would a subsequent bencher of the Law Society of
Alberta have felt was important in determining whether an applicant for
admission was of good character?
Answering these questions is challenging. The only published Canadian good
character decisions prior to 1989 are a 1922 decision in which the British
Columbia Superior Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review whether or not
sufficient proof of good character was provided, 11 and the previously cited Martin
decision in which the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed the Law Society’s
refusal to admit an applicant with communist beliefs. Some assessment can be
made, however, by drawing on W. Wesley Pue’s extensive analysis of this early
period of Canadian legal professionalism, including the use of character as part
of the establishment of lawyers’ professional identity. Pue argues that the
creation of the structures of lawyer professionalism in Canada was a deliberate
act, a response by lawyers to cultural and social conditions, to their sense of
Canada (especially western Canada) as a fundamentally egalitarian society, but
also one threatened by disruptive forces of social change and radicalism. To
those lawyers, professionalism, especially professionalism as it was developing
in the United States, was “a social vision which held forth the promise of founding
a better world on terrain mid-way between the Bolshevik abyss and a sort of
ancien regime repression.”12
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Professionalism in this sense had three components: ensuring a particular form
of lawyer education, one directed towards creating a better kind of person;
establishing admission standards that would ensure that the right kind of people
became lawyers; setting standards of lawyer behaviour and disciplining those
lawyers who broached them. Through all three components ran a common
thread: the emphasis was never on technical competence, it was on the type of
person the lawyer was. As indicated by the quotation from Martin, legal
education was designed to take men of “high character” and to develop them into
individuals who were “trustworthy, honourable and competent”. Admission was
also oriented towards the type of person the lawyer would be, focused on
“centrally important questions regarding what sort of person from what sort of
background could properly embody law in a new British dominion”.13 And finally,
discipline and conduct was oriented in part at behaviours which were
undesirable, but more fundamentally at ridding the profession of bad people. As
dramatically expressed by Sir James Aikins, President of the Canadian Bar
Association, “If the legal profession refuses to ruthlessly rid itself of its barnacles
and fungus, how can the public be expected to extend to the profession, as a
profession, the high honor, the dignity and revenue which that profession rightly
deserves”.14
When viewed in this context it seems likely that a lawyer in 1920, when asked
what good character is, and how you know whether it is present or absent, would
have drawn some connection between bad acts and bad character, and between
good acts and good character. But that connection would not have been an
exercise in psychological prediction. Sir James Aikins would not have viewed
bad conduct as empirically or probabilistically relevant to whether the person
engaging in that conduct was at heightened risk of behaving badly in the future
(although he probably would have thought it quite likely); he would have viewed
bad conduct as evidence of a bad nature, indicating a person as fundamentally
unworthy of admittance to the profession. Moreover, as evidenced by the
historical association in the United States of the good character requirement with
denial of admission to whole groups of people, including women and minorities, 15
there was a perception of good character arguably entirely unrelated to how one
had lived one’s life in a particular sense. Character was generic, general and
related to the essential “truth” of a man, rather than to any particular acts he had
committed (or might commit in the future).
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This summary of the historical conception of character is supported by Kronman,
whose idea of the “lawyer-statesman” invokes the historical relationship between
the lawyer-statesman and character:
By character I mean, broadly speaking, an ensemble of settled
dispositions – of habitual feelings and desires. To have character of
a certain sort is to possess a set of such dispositions that is
identifiable and distinct being more calm or cautious than most
people and better able to sympathize with a wide range of
conflicting points of view
the trait of prudence or practical
wisdom calmness in his deliberations, together with a balanced
sympathy
the lawyer-statesman’s professional standing is as
much to be explained by who he is as what he knows.
The ideal of the lawyer statesman was an ideal of character.16
How does that vision of character relate to the modern application of the
requirement? There is much more information about the understanding of the
good character requirement today, with law society decisions, guidelines, stated
purposes, and a governing definition. 17 Based on that information, it appears that
the current understanding of the meaning and significance of good character is
somewhat confused. On the one hand, the justification for the requirement
relates fundamentally to protection of the public; it is through character screening
that the “high ethical standards” of the profession will be maintained. 18 Character
is viewed as the “well spring of professional conduct in lawyers,”19 and the
general test for determining character is oriented towards indicating whether the
past misconduct indicates an absence of current good character. The applicant
must demonstrate that he or she is currently of good character taking into
account:
a. the nature and duration of the [prior] misconduct; b. whether the
applicant is remorseful; c. what rehabilitative efforts, if any, have
been taken, and the success of such efforts; d. the applicant’s
conduct since the proven misconduct.20
On the other hand, the definition for character adopted by the law societies is
highly generic and general:
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Character is that combination of qualities or features distinguishing
one person from another. Good character connotes moral or
ethical strength, distinguishable as an amalgam of virtuous or
socially acceptable attributes or traits which undoubtedly include,
among others, integrity, candour, empathy, and honesty.21
It may be that this definition – with its emphasis on “socially acceptable attributes
and traits,” and its reference to “integrity, candour, empathy, and honesty” as
examples of those traits – is more psychologically rooted, and also distinct from
the description of character in Martin, with its emphasis on moral development
and virtues such as “honour”. However, the definition is a far cry from a standard
psychologist definition of character:
The enduring, patterned functioning of an individual. As perceived
by others, it is the person’s habitual way of thinking, feeling, and
acting. Understood psychodynamically, character is the person’s
habitual mode of reconciling intrapsychic conflicts. Character
stands beside, but may be differentiated from, other terms for
global aspects of personality, such as identity, self, and ego.22
Further, in several cases the Law Society of Upper Canada has strongly rejected
any suggestion that an applicant must demonstrate that she is a low risk to the
public in the future. 23 In addition, there are only two reported cases in which
significant weight was placed on psychological evidence with respect to the
applicant. 24 In most cases no psychological evidence is introduced, and no
significance is given to that fact by the decision-maker.25
This suggests some uncertainty in the current approach to good character.
Decision-makers appear (largely) to recognize that, in the modern era, restricting
the profession to those who meet some vaguely articulated notion of ethical
character is not justifiable. At the same time, however, decision-makers have not
embraced a fully psychological concept of character. The generic definition of
character, the adamant refusal to focus attention on the likelihood of misconduct
21
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in the future, and the lack of reliance on psychological evidence about the
character of the applicant, suggest that law societies still view character as at
least in part ethical or cultural, rather than strictly psychological. That is, the law
societies do not talk in terms of an ethical conception of character, but the way in
which they search for character amounts, in most cases, most of the time, to a
search for ethical character.
Why does this matter? What is the difference between ethical and psychological
character, and why might the law societies’ continued regulation of ethical, as
opposed to psychological, character be problematic?
The differences between ethical and psychological character can perhaps be
best explained through articulating a distinction between the ethical concept of
“character” and the psychological concept of “personality”.26 “Character” is, in
essence, derived from the Aristotelian philosophy of virtue ethics, in which the
combination of an individual’s possession of virtues with the exercise of practical
judgment will shape her decisions and result (ultimately) in Eudaimonia
(flourishing).27 It necessarily involves moral distinction, identification of aspects
of character as good (virtues) or bad (vices). Character as understood by virtue
ethics may be subject to the critique of empirical invalidity,28 but its orientation
fundamentally is not empirical or predictive; it is normative and philosophical. 29
Further, the traits of character may be understood as likely to result in behaviour
consistent with those traits (honesty with truth telling, for example) but the
correlation is not strong, if for no other reason than that virtue ethics understands
behaviour as a combination of the aspects of a person’s character and her
exercise of practical judgment; conduct does not flow from character alone. A
person who lies may or may not have the virtue of honesty; it depends what other
virtues were implicated by the situation, and how the individual assessed what
the facts required.
Personality, by contrast, is a concept of behavioural psychology, a discipline that
expressly rejects the relevance of character:
Gordon Allport, the main personality trait theorist in 20th century
United States psychology, explicitly banished the term character
from academic discourse concerning personality. He argued that
character was the subject matter of philosophy not psychology.
The traits he urged psychologists to study were presumably
objective entities (Allport dubbed them neuropsychic structures)
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stripped of moral significance and linked to “adjustment” but not
imbued with inherent value. 30
Personality constitutes, loosely, the empirically identified and measured
dispositions of individuals, dispositions identified through assessment of
individual behaviour, how individuals are perceived by others, and how
individuals perceive themselves.31 There are five general “factors” of personality
that will have links to behaviour: “I: Extraversion/introversion (or Surgency); II:
Friendliness/hostility (or Agreeableness); III: Conscientiousness (or Will); IV:
Neuroticism/emotional stability (or Emotional Stability); and V: Intellect (or
Openness).”32 There is no necessary moral judgment associated with the
possession of one personality trait over another,33 and the relevance of
personality traits is their correlation to certain patterns of conduct – patterns of
conduct indicate personality,34 and personality is predictive of patterns of
conduct. 35
Given that distinction, why is regulation of ethical character not justified? In brief,
because it is non-empirical and because it potentially incorporates values that a
modern lawyer should not be required to embrace as a condition of bar
admission.
Character in the general ethical sense has no empirically demonstrated
relevance to future conduct.36 As John Doris and others have cogently argued,
the overwhelming evidence of social psychology is that character writ large is
non-predictive of conduct.37 There may be temporal stability of behaviour, and
locally identifiable character traits that can be linked to conduct, but general
ethical character has little empirical validity as a predictor of future conduct,
whatever its philosophical merit. Moreover, in analyzing behaviour in a particular
situation, the general approach of virtue ethics has only marginal ability to relate
particular behaviours to an individual’s possession (or not) or character. For
example, one virtue ethicist defending virtue ethics from the critique of social
30
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psychology, and in particular from the argument that the Milgram experiment
showed the significance of situations over character, suggested:
Admittedly, Milgrams’s experiments show that a remarkable
number of subjects administer electric shocks of considerable
severity, in experimental situations of a certain type. The tendency
to perform beneficient acts is arguably not as robust as one might
hope. However, there was considerable variation in the mental
states of those prepared to administer such shocks, and those
differences may point to character traits of, for example,
compassion, benevolence, respect for authority and commitments,
which manifest themselves in various ways in dilemmatic
situations. 38
This observation may be descriptively valid from the vantage point of virtue
ethics, but it does not do much work, empirically speaking, for explaining the
character of the individuals in the experiment.
This lack of empirical foundation tends to lead to the result, documented
elsewhere, 39 that law society determinations of character tend to rest largely on
decision-makers’ impressionistic assessment of an applicant as a witness.
Decision-makers cannot draw satisfactory conclusions of character from past bad
acts, they do not have any psychological evidence in most cases, and they have
declined to engage in any type of predictive exercise as to the actual risk posed
by this applicant. As a consequence, the decisions end up turning on whether
the applicant provides evidence which is “unsatisfactory”40 or lacking in
“candour,”41 whether the applicant “displays a certain caginess bordering on
arrogance” 42 or by contrast is not “wishy-washy,”43 provides self-reporting that is
“full and frank” 44 or speaks “clearly, eloquently and without qualification state[s]
that her actions were wrong.”45
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This result seems facially unfair. A prospective applicant is denied admission not
because she poses any empirically demonstrable threat to the public, or presents
an increased risk of not maintaining the high ethical standards of the profession,
but rather because she doesn’t fit within some inchoate, vague idea of the right
type of lawyer. She is being denied admission because the decision-makers do
not feel she has the right stuff to be a lawyer-statesman.
This leads to the second issue with ethical character as a basis of regulation – its
potential incorporation of contested values such as honour, integrity and civility. 46
While the 144 original members of the Law Society of Alberta may have been in
agreement as to the relevance and significance of those “virtues,” and while
some modern commentators such as Kronman may endorse their continued
importance, they cannot validly constitute a universal requirement for law society
admission. Moreover, because the definition of “character” endorsed by the law
societies is so general, and includes anything going to “moral or ethical strength,”
there is no reason to be confident that decision-makers will limit the admission
requirements to those virtues of character broadly accepted as relevant to the
ethics of lawyering.
In sum, to the extent the current approach to good character is consistent with its
historical antecedents it is impossible to justify. It denies an applicant admission
to the law society for what amounts to not much of a reason at all, certainly not a
reason based on any empirically plausible assertion regarding the particular
applicant. At the same time, however, those antecedents appear to have
prevented the full evolution of the good character requirement into an empirically
grounded notion of character, in which character is viewed as something relevant
to whether a particular applicant, in fact, poses a risk with which the law society
is justifiably concerned. Good character is, as currently approached in Canada,
neither wholly “ethical” and philosophical, nor wholly “psychological” and
empirical.
Assuming that regulation of ethical character is not justifiable, the remainder of
this paper considers whether it is possible for the law society to develop the good
character requirement into an empirical measure of the risk a particular applicant
poses to the public. Specifically, does identification of a self-consciously
psychologically oriented determination of whether an applicant has personality
traits or flaws which, in the circumstances of legal practice, pose a threat to the
public or to the maintenance of ethical standards, present a viable regulatory
option for law societies? Can character be psychologized?
The following section considers this question in three parts: 1) how successful
have law societies been in employing psychological evidence in those cases
where they have done so? 2) how have the courts used psychological evidence
in contexts where a psychological standard is legally imposed – determinations
of the “best interests” of a child in a custody dispute and of an offender’s
46
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“dangerousness?” and 3) does psychological evidence work – can psychologists
make valid empirical predictions of future behaviour from current facts?
III. Using Psychological Evidence
A. Psychological Evidence in Good Character Proceedings
As noted, the good character hearings have not widely embraced the use of
psychological evidence in assessing character. Only two of the published good
character proceedings include the introduction and consideration of significant
psychological evidence with respect to the applicants. This section will outline
those two cases to demonstrate how, even though psychological evidence was
introduced, the panels were fundamentally uncertain about how to use it. In
neither of the decisions did the panel direct its consideration of that evidence to
the question of whether, if the applicant became a lawyer, he posed a particular
threat to the protection of the public, or to the maintenance of ethical standards.
The first case, Re P(DM) considered the application for admission of DMP, who
had been convicted of offences related to pedophilic sexual assault.47 One of the
children was a profoundly deaf girl whom DMP met while working as a school
bus driver. He had a sexual relationship with the girl from the time she was nine
years old until she was sixteen. The second child was his biological daughter,
with whom he had sexual relations from the time she was four until she was
seven. DMP pled guilty to sexual assault and having sexual relations with a
minor, and was sentenced to eight months in jail and three years of probation.
The justification for this relatively light sentence was, in the judge’s view, to give
DMP an opportunity to turn his life around and to succeed in law school. 48 DMP
did attend law school, obtained and completed articles and applied for admission
to the Law Society of Upper Canada.
His application was rejected on the basis that he was not of good character. A
central issue for the panel was whether DMP was rehabilitated. The panel found
that when he committed the crimes DMP was clearly not of good character; the
question was whether, in the intervening five years, his character has “so
changed that he can now be said to be of good character”.49 To answer this
question the panel considered a variety of psychological evidence. They
received reports from his treating psychologist, and from five other psychologists,
most of whom had not met DMP, but had read the prepared reports and records.
The conclusion of DMP’s treating psychologist was that DMP was a “functional”
pedophile not a “core” pedophile, he was someone who had sex with children
because he had an inability to form relationships with adult women. In the first
instance the treating psychologist was of the view that DMP would require
significant therapy to develop his ability to form better relationships with adult
women. However, less than a year later the treating psychologist was of the
view that DMP was cured. He did not provide an explanation for this change in
his opinion. The other psychologists who provided evidence to the panel
47
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disagreed with the treating psychologist on his prognosis, noting that the
absence of evidence that DMP could form relations with adult women suggested
that he was still at risk to re-offend. In addition, at least one report suggested
that treating psychologists tend to lose the ability to judge their own patients with
accuracy. The panel accepted the evidence of these other psychologists, and
rejected that of the treating psychologist. They concluded that there “is no
objective basis for the conclusion that Mr. P has been cured of his pedophilia.”
While the panel appears to have been careful and thoughtful in its consideration
of how to balance this evidence, the use which it makes of the evidence is
somewhat puzzling. Should the question not be whether, given the psychological
evidence, DMP posed a risk to the public if he was admitted to the bar? The
general question of whether he was likely to be a recidivist is dealt with
elsewhere in the legal system, in the original criminal sanction and in the
opportunity for offenders to be labeled as “dangerous” and subject to an
indefinite term of incarceration. The judge in the criminal case did not appear
especially concerned with the recidivism problem, stating that “I think there is a
good prospect for you”.50 Further, it is not clear that being a lawyer would have
heightened DMP’s likelihood of re-offending; lawyers are probably less likely than
many people to encounter children in their daily work lives. The most plausible
explanation is that while this decision uses psychological evidence, it does not do
so because of a psychological explanation of the importance of character – as a
predictor of behaviour as a lawyer. It uses psychological evidence to bolster
what is essentially an ethical view of character: since DMP did these horrific acts,
and the possibility of him doing them again cannot be ruled out, he is, in general,
a man of bad character who ought not to be admitted to the profession.
The other matter to include extensive psychological evidence was Re Preyra, in
which the Law Society of Upper Canada twice heard the application for
admission of Preyra, who falsified his resume and transcripts in applying for
articles. Preyra was denied admission after the first hearing in 2000, and
admitted after the second hearing in 2003.
In both hearings extensive
psychological evidence was presented. In the first hearing there were five
medical reports prepared by three doctors (two psychologists and one
psychiatrist). Preyra completed psychological testing, although the testing was
not done under appropriate conditions, and one of the doctors reported that
Preyra had “tried to best the test in an unsophisticated way”.51 Although Preyra’s
treating psychologist was of the view that Preyra had been successfully treated
through a course of “brief dynamic psychotherapy,” that doctor also testified that
in his view many people padded their resumes. One of the other doctors (Dr.
Klassen, quoted at the outset of this paper) reported that while Preyra was not
mentally ill, he was “very angry” and suffered from “grandiosity, a sense of being
special or unique, with a need for admiration and, perhaps most significantly, a
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sense of entitlement”.52 Dr. Klassen expressed doubt as to whether Preyra had
in fact been treated successfully.
In deciding not to admit Preyra after that hearing, the panel did not expressly
refer to the psychological evidence. The only comment it made on the evidence
was to disagree with the treating psychologists’ assessment that padding a
resume was not a significant matter.
In the second hearing more psychological evidence was introduced. A new
psychiatrist, who had treated Preyra for the prior three years, testified, and Dr.
Klassen was also asked by the Law Society to re-assess Preyra. Preyra again
underwent psychological testing. The treating psychiatrist’s evidence was
positive, and Dr. Klassen’s assessment was also more positive. Preyra showed
improved functioning on the psychological testing. In reaching the decision to
admit Preyra, the panel noted the favourable psychological evidence and
appeared to rely on it, although the panel was obviously uncertain as to how to
incorporate the evidence given the stated irrelevance of predictions of future
conduct:
Good character is determined at the date of the hearing. Both
section 27 and the case law under this section are clear that no
speculation as to Mr. Preyra’s future behaviour is permitted. It is
presumably for this reason that restrictions or conditions cannot be
placed on the admission of a member. Despite that, Dr. Klassen
testified that he could not predict Mr. Preyra’s future behaviour, Mr.
Preyra is not required to demonstrate that the risk of future
dishonesty is unlikely or non-existent. It is necessary, however, to
ensure that, on a balance of probabilities, Mr. Preyra’s change from
bad character to good character is bona fide.53
I would seem, then, that even in the cases where psychological evidence is used,
decision-makers have not been able to incorporate that evidence into an
empirical fact-based consideration of the likelihood that a particular applicant
poses an increased risk to the public. The emphasis, even here, is on the ethical
aspect of character.
In approaching the question this way, the decisions contrast strongly to other
legal areas where courts are required to make psychological type determinations,
and in which extensive use is made of psychological evidence to allow the court
to do so.
B. The Use of Psychological Evidence
The use of psychological evidence in Canadian courts is prolific. One author
estimates that such evidence is introduced in over 100,000 cases a year.54 This
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section focuses on two contexts where psychological evidence is used to support
judges in making decisions regarding future behaviour: child custody hearings –
i.e., the application of the “best-interests of the child” test – and in dangerous
offender proceedings. The legal tests to be applied by judges in these areas are
general and only vaguely defined: “what is in the best interests of the child?” “Is
this individual dangerous”? As a consequence, courts seek to rely upon
psychological evidence to make decisions about what constitutes the best
decision going forward, to resolve the uncertainty of applying such a broad test to
uncertain facts. This section briefly overviews the nature of the court’s reliance
upon psychological evidence in these contexts.
1. Child Custody
The legal test for custody in Canada is the “best interests of the child.”55 Custody
disputes arise between parents, and between parents and the state (where a
child has been apprehended). In determining custody in either case the court
has to answer questions – “Who is a better parent?” and “What situation is in the
best interests of the child?” – the answers to which are psychological, not legal.
In addition, the answers are prospective and predictive; they turn on what will be,
not on what was. The best interests test has been subject to ruthless criticism on
the grounds of indeterminacy, and in particular the absence of legal guidance
and the potential for infusion of a judge’s personal biases.56 To address these
concerns legislation gives judges a laundry list of factors to consider in awarding
custody.57 Yet these factors are still undefined, and the different factors are not
placed in priority, leaving them substantially subjective such that the problem of
indeterminacy persists.58
It is the legal void created by the psychological nature of the questions, the
problem of prediction, and of general indeterminacy, that forces judges to rely on
psychological evidence. 59 Some form of psychological evidence is presented in
virtually every child custody hearing, and is relied upon by the court in some
manner.
The evidence is used in a variety of ways. These include assisting the court in
understanding, for example, the significance of psychological issues faced by a
parent, the likely impact of a custody decision on a child, and the appropriate
balance of factors relevant to the court’s determination. For our purposes,
however, the key observation is that courts rely on a psychologist to
independently assess a parent to determine whether being with that parent is in
55

See, for example, Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5 at s. 18(1).
Bernd Walter, Janine Alison Isenegger and Hicholas Bala, “’Best Interests’ in Child Protection Proceedings: Implications
and Alternatives” (1995) 12 Can. J. Fam. Law at para. 17; T.J. Hester, “The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child
Custody Determinations Incident to Divorce” (1992) 14 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 109 at 109; Daniel W. Shuman, “What
Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About ‘The Best Interests of the Child?’ An Essay on Common
Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence” (1997-1998) 31 Fam. L.Q. 551 at 567.
57
Supra, note 55 at s. 18(2)(b). The list includes factors such as: the child’s physical, psychological and emotional needs,
the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, and any plans proposed for the child’s care
and upbringing.
58
Best Interests supra, note 56 at para. 18.
59
Thomas R. Litwack, Gwendolyn L. Gerber and C. Abraham Fenster, “The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody
Disputes” (1979-1980) 18 J. Fam. L. 269 at 271.
56

15
the best interests of the child going forward – to gather facts about the parent
and child as they are today, and to make predictions about what will happen in
the future. The psychologist helps the court to filter out the dysfunctional
background noise of a broken-down family and hone in on the true qualities of a
parent that will affect his or her parenting going forward.60 Psychological
evidence allows the court to bridge the gap between the ascertainable facts that
can be established in a court (for example, that a parent behaved in a particular
way), and the proper outcome given those facts and the ephemeral target of the
“best interests” of the child.
For example, in C(G) v. T.V-F61 the Supreme Court of Canada considered a
custody dispute between the sister of the deceased mother of the children, and
the children’s father. The children had been in the sole custody of the mother;
when she became terminally ill they went to live with their aunt. Upon the
mother’s death the father sought and was awarded sole custody in a habeas
corpus proceeding. However, the children repeatedly ran away to their aunt, and
the aunt again sought custody. A psychologist took these facts and from them
drew a variety of conclusions about the best interests of the child, in particular
related to the effect of the positive relationship between the aunt and the
children’s deceased mother, and the dysfunctional relationship between the
father and the deceased mother. In her view the effect of these relationships
was to fundamentally disrupt the ability of the children to thrive were they to be
required to live with their father. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial
judge’s award of custody to the aunt, and did so substantially on the basis of this
evidence which they reproduced in significant part in the judgment.62
Psychological evidence is a cornerstone of custody decision-making and is
essential to the “best interests” test. The use of psychological evidence is not
just prolific in custody cases, but also fundamental to the structure and reasoning
of the ultimate decision. Even in decisions where the outcome seems to have
largely flowed from other facts – where, for example, the parents had a three day
armed stand-off police with their infant present 63 – judges will use psychological
evidence to legitimate their decision.
2. Dangerous Offender Proceedings 64
Psychological evidence is even more entrenched in dangerous offender
proceedings, so much so that this evidence is required by the Criminal Code. 65
The necessity of psychological evidence in this context is great. The rationale for
60

For example, in Fraser v. Moreland [2006] NSJ No. 433 (NSCA), the father accused the mother of illegal drug use and
the mother accused the father of sexually assaulting her and of physically abusing the children. The father had two prior
convictions for driving while impaired. A psychologist report concluded that the mother was intelligent and that the
children responded better to her, and that there was no evidence either of the mother’s drug use or of the father abusing
the children. The psychologist recommended that the mother be awarded custody. Both the trial court and the appellate
court followed this recommendation.
61
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 244.
62
Ibid. at para. 6.
63
Children’s Aid of Halifax v. C.V., [2005] N.S.J. No. 217 (NSCA).
64
Canadian appellate dangerous offender cases from January 2006 to June 2008 were examined for this section of the
paper.
65
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 at ss. 752.1(1) and 753(1).

16
a dangerous offender designation is to prevent the reoccurrence of further
criminal acts in the future and, thus, requires some type of forecasting that such
criminal acts are or are not likely to occur. Specifically, the Crown must prove
two factors in a dangerous offender proceeding. 66 The first is that the accused
committed a serious personal injury offence, which does not require
psychological evidence. The second is that the accused has engaged in
repetitive criminal behaviour due to an inability to restrain him or herself and this
failure is likely to cause a future violent offence. It is this second step that
requires psychological evidence to establish this future likelihood. To compound
this prediction further, if these two criteria are met then the Court must exercise
its discretion in assigning either a dangerous offender or long-term offender
designation.
The difference between the two is the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence, which is the result of a dangerous offender designation.
Thus, to find that one is a dangerous offender, the Court must be satisfied that
there is no reasonable possibility that the offender’s risk can be controlled by
imposing a determinate long-term offender sentence. Not only is psychological
evidence tendered to predict whether generally there is a risk of re-offending, but
also to specifically predict whether this risk will dissipate after the accused has
been imprisoned.
Between these two requirements, the Court is quite
demanding on its psychological experts.
The way in which the court relies on psychological evidence in this context is
uniform: they accept it. The Court is reluctant to even critique psychological
evidence offered unless there is a glaring error with an expert’s conclusions, for
example the expert opines that the accused may be manageable under intense
supervision, supervision which does not accord with the practical standards in
reality.67 Predictions about the risk of future violence go essentially unchallenged
by the Court. There is so much reliance on expert evidence in this arena that
there is some indication that the lines between the expert and the decision-maker
have become blurred. Experts in a few cases have felt comfortable crossing the
evidentiary-legal line, giving not just behavioural predictions but also legal
designation recommendations.68
The Court’s dependence on psychological evidence in dangerous offender cases
cannot be overstated. A designation cannot be made without it; the Court is
simply not in the position to make prediction of future violent behaviour on its
own. Psychological prediction evidence is foundational to dangerous offender
proceedings.
C. The Validity of Psychological Predictions
To this point it is arguable that the reliance on psychological evidence in custody
and dangerousness proceedings supports the use of psychological evidence in
good character decisions. As noted, good character decisions, like custody and
66
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dangerousness, involve an existing set of facts and the need to make predictions
about the future, in this case about greater likelihood of risks to the public should
the person be admitted. They also involve a standard – the nature of an
applicant’s character and its relationship to public protection – that is essentially
psychological in nature. 69 The universal and significant reliance on psychological
evidence in custody and dangerousness proceedings shows judicial acceptance
of its validity and, given the similarity of the circumstances, provides prima facie
support for its use here.
The problem, however, is that there seems to be significant academic consensus
that judicial confidence in the use of psychological evidence in these other
contexts is not especially justified. Indeed, the empirical data and its academic
analysis suggests that the psychological evidence relied upon by the courts is
deeply suspect. Despite its obvious relevance and apparent helpfulness to
courts’ application of what are essentially psychological legal standards,
psychological evidence doesn’t do what it is supposed to do: it does not reliably
measure future dangerousness or future parenting. This section reviews that
academic literature.
In determining whether psychological predictions are valid, it is necessary to
understand how they are made. In simple terms, future behaviour is a function of
personality in situation. 70 Obviously, however, even with only these two relevant
variables making a prediction as to future conduct is difficult – there are
interactions not only between personality and situation but also within personality
traits and within situation traits.71 For example, one who possesses the
personality traits of aggression and suggestibility may have a greater propensity
for violence than would be expected from the presence of either trait separately.
Likewise the presence of a threatening individual and a weapon may produce a
greater likelihood of a violent response than if only a single variable is present.
As people generally possess greater than two personality traits and can find
themselves in a myriad of situations, the simple equation “personality x situation”
grows exponentially more complicated. Reaching a specific prediction of specific
behaviour, i.e. violence, is extremely difficult.
In the criminal context there are two approaches used by psychologists to predict
behaviour: clinical and actuarial. Clinical prediction is simply a subjective
decision made by a psychology professional after examining the subject and
combining his or her characteristics in an intuitive way.72 There are no set
factors that the professional must consider in every case, and in fact, the
professional may not even be aware of factors he or she is relying on in reaching
69
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a conclusion. 73 More recently, actuarial prediction has gained much attention in
the psychology community. Actuarial prediction is a statistical method in which
the psychology professional will record the subject’s characteristics and combine
them in accordance with a set mathematical model. 74 One author organizes the
most commonly measured factors into four categories: what the person “is” (age,
gender, race and personality), what the person “has” (mental disorder, substance
abuse), what the person “has done” (prior crime and violence) and what has
“been done” to the person (family environment and victimization). 75
There is significant empirical data with respect to the predictive accuracy of both
clinical and actuarial approaches. With respect to clinical predictions, two
famous American studies provide a natural starting point for analysis. In the
1960s American dangerous offender laws changed as a result of court
challenges. The Baxstrom study arose from the transfer of almost 1,000
dangerous offenders from hospitals for the criminally insane to civil mental
hospitals in New York State after judicial invalidation of the prior approach. 76
Because these dangerous offenders had been designated as such based on a
positive prediction of future violence, the transfer provided the opportunity to test
these predictions in the context of a civil facility.77 The results were remarkable.
Despite the prediction of dangerousness for all Baxstrom patients, only 20%
committed an assault 78 during the fours years subsequent to the transfer.79
Further, in that four-year period only 3% of these “dangerous offenders” were
dangerous enough to be sent back to the hospital for the criminally insane. 80 The
Baxstrom study expanded in scope when 121 Baxstrom patients were
additionally released from the civil hospital, allowing observation of these once
labeled dangerous offenders in the community.81 In the two and a half years
subsequent to their release only 9 of the 121 were convicted of a crime, and only
one of those convictions was for a violent offence. 82 This suggests that 120 of
the 121 released offenders (99.2%) were labeled erroneously.
Following the Baxstrom study, there was a second successful case in
Pennsylvania, Dixon v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,83 which spurred a replicate study.84 The results of this study were
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notably similar; only 14% of the patients initially thought to be dangerous
engaged in “assaultive behaviour” in the four years subsequent to their release. 85
One further study followed 257 male felony defendants, 60% of whom were
predicted to be dangerous.86 Both groups were hospitalized, the dangerous at a
correctional hospital and the non-dangerous at a high-security civil facility.87 The
authors note the conditions and treatment at the facilities were essentially
identical, thus controlling for many variables that were not controlled in the earlier
studies. 88 The results of the study were surprising – there was no significant
difference between the assaults committed by the dangerous and non-dangerous
patients – dangerous offenders had only a marginally greater frequency of
assaults, the difference being small enough to be explained as simply random
variation. 89 Further, the study considered the occurrence of subsequent arrests
upon release. Fourteen percent of dangerous offenders and 16% of nondangerous offenders were rearrested for a violent offence. 90
Since these initial large and relatively dramatic studies, psychologists have only
infrequently reconsidered the validity of clinical predictions, although a handful of
studies have been conducted. 91 One study assessed predictions of violence in
Subsequent violence was
emergency patients in a civil hospital. 92
comprehensively evaluated; researchers incorporated novel data: self-reporting
and community informants.93 This study concluded that 53% of those predicted
to be “of concern” for future violence were violent subsequently; 36% of those
patients not of concern were violent subsequently. 94 A second study focused on
inpatient violence. Nurses made an initial prediction as to whether they viewed a
patient as of low, moderate or high risk for violence. Ten percent of the low
group, 24% of the moderate group and 40% of the high risk group committed
violence.
While these results clearly suggest greater predictive accuracy, they are far from
reassuring. In the first study the predictive accuracy is relatively close to random,
to flipping a coin. 95 In the second study the accuracy was fairly high for patients
viewed as of low risk of violence, but was wildly inaccurate – wrong 60% of the
time – for patients predicted to be violent.
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The conclusion drawn from these studies – that clinical prediction is essentially
impossible – has been subject to criticism. It is argued, for example, that the
problem is not clinical prediction per se; it is rather the institutional pressures
created by dangerousness proceedings. Because of those pressures the
accuracy of prediction is being influenced by a bias on the part of the
professional making the prediction. 96 Those professionals either intentionally
over-predict to keep career criminals and chronic offenders institutionalized, 97 or
are reacting unconsciously to an incentive to over-predict.98 Intentional overprediction seems unlikely and difficult to prove; it is clear, however, that there is
an incentive for over-prediction. The repercussions of a false negative are
severe. If an individual predicted not to be dangerous commits a subsequent
egregious violent crime, the result is a public outcry and questioning of the
process by which this decision was made. 99 On the other hand, if there is a trend
toward over-prediction, there is no consequence for the predictor or for the
judicial system, only for the person mis-identified and incarcerated. 100 The
substance of this critique, therefore, is that predictions of violence are not
inaccurate, they are rather coloured by either a bias or an agenda on the part of
the prediction-maker.
The significance of this critique should not be overstated, however. In almost
every area of human endeavor these kinds of biases can arise – the possibility of
true disinterest is unlikely. In addition, and more importantly, the existence of
assessor bias is unlikely to account for the sheer magnitude of the statistical
unreliability of these assessments. It may account for a certain amount of it, but
it does not explain why the accuracy of predictions in some studies was shown to
be little better than flipping a coin. Finally, it certainly does not explain why in
some studies the predictions of non-violent future behaviour were also incorrect –
inaccurate by as much as 36%.101
Others have suggested that the predictions at issue, particularly in the Baxstrom
and Dixon studies, were out of date. That is, the predictions were made at the
time of incarceration and at that time the offenders were in fact dangerous. But,
over the time spent institutionalized they have been treated and are now less
dangerous such that the initial prediction is no longer accurate. 102 In addition, by
the time the studies were completed the offenders were older, and age
notoriously decreases dangerous behaviour.103 The problem with these critiques,
however, is that they essentially amount to an argument that as circumstances
change predictions may become inaccurate. But if the court is going to rely on
predictions to keep a person indefinitely incarcerated the predictions have to be
able to account for changing circumstances – the changing circumstances (such
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as aging) explain why the prediction was inaccurate, they do not make it possible
to predict accurately. Also, the empirical claim of the first of these arguments is
suspect, as the studies were not examining the initial prediction; the studies were
examining the accuracy of the decision to keep the offender in the hospital. 104
Finally, it has been suggested that these prediction studies ha ve underestimated
the actual violence committed by those predicted to be dangerous offenders.
Therefore, the apparent over-prediction of dangerousness is a function of later
under-recording of violence not of prior over-estimation. 105 It is uncontroversial
that there is some underestimation of violence, but the question is whether it is
enough to invalidate or at least call into question the results of the above
studies. 106 This seems unlikely. As noted earlier, in at least one of the more
recent studies the researchers relied upon additional reporting measures, and
the predictions were still inaccurate. 107 In addition, there have been studies that
have examined the extent of unreported violence. One study examined a group
of repeat offenders and found that for every arrest, the offender had committed
seven unreported offences, a second study found a rate of ten felonies per
arrest.108 Thus, the studies concluded that unreported violence is generally
being committed by the same people – the ones eventually getting caught. It
follows then, that these studies do not refute the inaccuracy of prediction; rather
they support the proposition that of the true dangerous offenders, some are more
dangerous than others. While it is true that studies will underestimate the actual
amount of violence, it is unlikely that the underestimation is significant enough to
correct for the inaccuracy of prediction.
In sum, then, even with these critiques, the validity of clinical assessment of
future behaviour is doubtful. This is the case even where the behaviour in
question is relatively extreme and also frequent, as it is for individuals designated
as dangerous or likely to be violent.
With respect to actuarial predictions, the general consensus appears to be far
more positive. One author summarizes three of the most notable actuarial
models used for predicting violence, and reviews literature assessing the
accuracy of each model. Each model categorizes subjects into several risk
categorizes ranging from low to high. The literature review indicated that for each
model there was a considerable degree of accuracy. Overall, where application
of a model generated the lowest predicted likelihood of future violence, 1-11% of
subjects were actually violent; where the application of a model generated the
highest predicted likelihood of future violence 75-100% of the subjects were
actually violent. 109
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A 1996 meta-analysis summarized the results of 136 studies of the relative
accuracy of clinical and actuarial predictions.110 Of the 136 studies, 64 found
actuarial methods to be significantly more accurate while only 8 preferred clinical
predictions, with the remaining studies showing no significant difference between
the two methods of prediction. 111
Not surprisingly, there has been reluctance to adopt actuarial prediction
techniques for use in the courtroom, despite their increased accuracy. Use of
actuarial methods is not always a practical possibility as there may be insufficient
time or a situation may arise where an actuarial model does not exist.112 It is
likely, for example, that no actuarial calculations could be done with respect to
the relationship between past conduct by applicants for admission to the bar and
future conduct as a lawyer.113 Further, actuarial methods are generally, not
specifically, accurate; they cannot account for the rare event, a determinative
factor in an individual case that is not included in the model. 114 Any individual
has the possibility to be the statistical outlier. There is some evidence of the use
of actuarial models in recent Canadian dangerous offender appeals cases, 115 but
the vast majority of cases still rely exclusively on clinical predictions of violence.
The results of the empirical studies testing the validity of predictions of violence
are not particularly encouraging. All studies report a significant rate of false
positives, that is, labeling a person as dangerous when in fact he or she is not.
To the extent that actuarial predictions improve the accuracy of predictions, their
use is simply not reflected in actual legal decision-making. While there are
various complications in the data arising from, inter alia, assessor incentives and
under-prediction of violence, none fundamentally undermine the conclusion that
there is only modest support for the proposition that psychological experts can
accurately predict future violence.
Is the story any better in the custody context?
Generally, predictions of the best interests of the child are determined in a similar
fashion to predictions of violence. Clinical predictions are simply the intuitive
conclusion of an experienced professional as to what custody arrangement will
be in the best interest of the child. Actuarial models are also available for
custody cases, but seem restricted to child protection cases where there are
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allegations of abuse or neglect of a child. 116 Only one of the Canadian custody
cases examined employed actuarial assessments. 117
Predictions of the best interests of the child are also problematic. Empirical
studies examining the validity of predictions in this context are rare. The studies
that do exist validate predictions on the basis of the consensus of the
professionals making a prediction. 118 No work has determined whether these
predictions, even where a consensus exists, are correct in practice.119
There exists one formidable obstacle preventing actual validation studies. The
best interest of a child is not a concrete, defined concept – there is no single
variable that one can measure to determine the precision of a prediction. If a
study were to assess the success rate of these psychological predictions, what
indicia would it consider: the child’s success in school, happiness, need for
counseling? The legal test poses this operational definition problem – there is no
well-defined outcome. 120 Thus the indeterminacy factor of the legal test is what
creates the need for psychological evidence, but it is also what prevents any expost assessment of its viability.121
In the absence of these studies, most critics of psychological evidence in the
custody context rely on analysis of predictions in a general sense, or rely on
empirical data with respect to the accuracy of predictions of violence, to assert
that predictions of behaviour relied on in custody decisions are simply not
accurate. 122 They supplement these findings with additional factors unique to
child custody cases to argue that in this context predictions are even more
fallible. Psychologists often make a prediction based on limited exposure to a
parent occurring at a stressful time; the behaviour that is most influential in
formulating a prediction may thus be highly atypical for the parent.123
Additionally, the information received directly from parents or children may be
biased. All parties involved may feel compelled to tell the psychologist what they
think he or she wants to hear, or what will advance each of their positions.124
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Similarly, children are malleable and may be indirectly or directly influenced by
their parents to speak or act in a certain way around the psychologist. 125
Some also argue that there is no way to predict long-term parenting ability and
the effect of changes in parenting ability on children. 126 A parent’s ability to deal
with a child may change throughout the course of the child’s development, and
the skills a parent possesses may be more useful at certain times during a child’s
life than others. Thus, basing a prediction on the assumption that parents will
continue to act and parent in the same way as they have in the past may be
erroneous.
The lack of studies assessing the accuracy of child custody predictions makes it
difficult to draw any specific conclusion as to their validity. The conceptual and
practical limitations are such that this type of accuracy study will be rare. Given
that the predictions in this context are far more specific, in a sense, than
predictions of violence (that is, the psychologist is seeking to predict one’s ability
to deal with his or her own children as opposed to one’s functioning in the
general community without resorting to violence), one might speculate that child
custody predictions may be more accurate. On the other hand, specific
predictions may in fact be more difficult given the broad and general nature of
psychology theory.127 This uncertainty has led some critics to conclude that
psychological evidence in child custody cases should be limited to the more
traditional role of assisting a judge in discovery, articulating, highlighting and
analyzing the facts before him or her, and that any predictive function should be
set aside. 128
There is thus good reason to doubt the reliability of psychological predictions as
to future conduct, despite the widespread reliance on these predictions in
custody and dangerousness decisions. There is also reason for general concern
with the incursion of expert evidence into judicial decision-making, general
concern that exists whenever expert evidence is introduced, but which arguably
compounds the accuracy problem. The concern arises from the fact that the
judge is the competent authority in a legal sense – the person charged with
deciding – but the expert’s knowledge in a particular area far outweighs the
judge’s. In particular, there exists the concern that there will be undue deference
to the expert, given that it is the expert instructing the decision-maker on how to
interpret the evidence. 129 While this role-reversal alone is highly influential to the
decision-maker, it can be especially problematic when there is much conflicting
evidence and the expert evidence is given priority over the rest.
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In addition, it is often difficult for decision-makers to discern whether expert
evidence is reliable. 130 The actual scientific problem is discussed above, but this
is potentially compounded by issues with expert bias and the lack of consensus
within a scientific community – a particularly common problem in psychology.131
The problems with bias and consensus are exacerbated by the adversarial
system – it is the parties selecting the experts. Given the flexibility of
psychological theories, it is very likely that both sides will have a psychology
expert that supports their claim. 132 This battle of the experts is troublesome
when the decision-maker is unable to spot the weaknesses in the evidence, as it
can lead to reliance on features such as the charisma or confidence of the expert
testifying.133
These evidentiary problems exist in every courtroom that deals with expert
evidence, even in the case of hard science – where there are accepted and
reliable scientific theories. But in the case of predicting future behaviour, the
problem becomes two-tiered: first, the scientific viability of the expert’s ability to
make such a prediction is questionable; and second, the questionable evidence
may not be used in a consistent and justifiable fashion once in the courtroom.
The final section will consider the implications of this analysis for the good
character requirement.
IV. The Psychology of Good Character
If law societies want to regulate admission on the basis of character they need to
justify doing so; they need some reasoned argument as to why such regulation is
legitimate. 134 As argued above, it is difficult to see any basis on which a law
society could justifiably regulate character as an ethical concept; there is no link
between character in this sense and law societies’ legitimate objectives of
protecting the public and maintaining ethical standards.135 If understood
psychologically, as a set of personal dispositions that, in certain circumstances,
lead to a greater likelihood of wrongful conduct, then regulation of character may
be justifiable. But then the question becomes, how is character in this sense
established? How can a law society determine whether an applicant for
admission has a personality trait that has manifested itself in circumstances
sufficiently similar to legal practice to warrant the prediction that the individual
poses a greater risk to the public should she be admitted to practice?
At first blush psychological evidence seems to provide an answer to this problem.
In both the custody and dangerousness contexts psychologists provide the court
with exactly this type of analysis: based on the current information about a
particular individual (or individuals) – his personality and how he has acted in
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various circumstances – what is the likely outcome going forward? If this
evidence was reliable, its use in these contexts – the overwhelming recognition
of its legitimacy by the judiciary – would be sufficient reason for its adoption in
the context of character review, and would provide a modern justification for the
retention of what is essentially a historical anachronism.
The glaring problem, however, is that the usefulness of this evidence in those
contexts is far from obvious. The academic consensus is that the predictions of
future conduct based on clinical assessment relied on in making those decisions
are largely inaccurate. Moreover, it is quite possible that clinical assessment is
even more likely to be inaccurate in the context of good character proceedings.
In dangerousness cases the individuals in question have committed a serious
personal injury offence and repeated criminal offences. There is a pattern of
behaviour that the psychologist can assess. 136 In addition, there are actuarial
models available that could at least confirm or qualify the clinical assessment
with some degree of accuracy. By contrast, in the context of good character the
behaviour that gives rises to the inquiry is highly variable, there may be no
repeated pattern of behaviour and, as noted, there is no actuarial model against
which to judge the clinical assessment.
In the custody contexts there may also be less situational variability to complicate
the validity of the assessment. In the custody context you have circumstances
which may change, but which at least have some relationship to each other: this
parent parenting this child now and this parent parenting this child in the future.
This may provide some reason to think, at least some of the time, that the
predictions have merit. In the good character context there may be little temporal
or situational relationship between the pre-application conduct and the situation
that the person will find herself in as a lawyer.
With respect to the argument that there is some reason to use the evidence in
good character hearings because of judicial recognition of its legitimacy
elsewhere, it needs to be noted that courts making determinations on
dangerousness or custody have little choice about whether to rely on
psychological evidence. Once an individual has been incarcerated repeatedly for
violent offences society has to make some determination about the
consequences for that individual, and how to manage the future risk that he
potentially presents. And once parents separate, or once a parent has
demonstrated an apparent incapacity to care for a child, some determination as
to what should happen to that child needs to be made. In making those arguably
unavoidable decisions the legislature has articulated defensible legal standards
on which to make them – prevention of future violence and protecting the best
interests of the child. It is the function of courts to apply those standards. Thus
judicial determination of the empirical foundation to which to apply those legal
principles is almost impossibly difficult but is also inescapable; the decision has
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to be made and the principles have to be applied. Whatever the flaws of
psychological evidence, it is likely to assist a judge in making those
determinations, and its use can be justified on that basis.
This perspective was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Lyons,137 in which the Court considered the constitutionality of the
dangerousness provisions. Lyons argued that one of the problems with the
provisions was the reliance on psychological evidence, given the essential
invalidity of that evidence. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It did not
disagree that the evidence was problematic, but simply asserted that in a
balance between a “risk of harm to innocent persons at the hands of an offender
who is judged likely to inflict it,”138 and the rights of that offender, the weight
should be placed on the rights of the innocent. The fallibility of the evidence may
warrant greater procedural protections, but did not invalidate the entire exercise.
Can a similar argument be made about the good character requirement?
Perhaps. Arguably a law society faced with an applicant who has behaved badly
has to make a decision about whether to admit that applicant. Doing so on the
basis of whether the applicant presents a risk to the protection of the public, or to
the maintenance of high ethical standards is a legitimate legal principle to apply
in making that admission decision. Determining the empirical foundation against
which to apply that principle involves a psychological question: given what this
person has done – their personality traits, the circumstances of the prior conduct,
and the circumstances of law practice – do they pose a greater risk to the public
or to the profession’s ethical standards? If they do, they should not be admitted.
Since a law society is almost certainly ill-suited to make this determination, and
could benefit from the assistance of psychological evidence, psychological
evidence should be relied upon by law societies in making this decision. Indeed,
it is arguable that no law society should be making this kind of predictive
psychological assessment without expert evidence. Because to do so will lead
inevitably to the subjective, applicant testimony driven decision-making which
currently pervades the process, and leads (consequently) to unpredictable and
arguably irrational decisions.
On closer examination, however, this argument is problematic. We agree that if
law societies are going to continue to scrutinize applicant “character” they need
to be more cognizant of the essentially psychological nature of the standard they
are imposing, and be more rigorous in considering the application on that basis,
including appropriate (i.e., critical) use of psychological evidence. But this begs
the question of whether the scrutiny of applicant character is warranted. As
noted, if the psychological evidence was first rate and reliable not much in the
way of reasons would be needed to justify using it to assess applicant character.
But the evidence isn’t first rate and reliable. It is unreliable. As such, it should
only be used if there is little other option, if the decision has to be made and the
evidence provides some grounds to assist the competent authority making it.
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That is arguably the case for dangerousness and certainly the case for custody,
but it is less obviously the case for character scrutiny. The good character
standard in Canada is not rigorously enforced. Only a handful of applicants are
denied admission in any given year, and some jurisdictions claim not to have
denied admission to anyone in the past five years.139 If the good character
requirement were to be eliminated tomorrow it would have little practical impact
on the public at large. This means that the retention of the requirement is best
understood as optional, its elimination as of marginal significance. Given that,
and given the impossibility of making psychological predictions with reliability, the
inevitable conclusion appears to be that the requirement should not be retained.
V. Conclusion
After he was denied admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada, DMP
committed suicide. While few individuals are denied admission on the basis of
character, and as just noted the protection of the public that results from the
application of the standard is minimal, it is important to be cognizant of the
potential hardship for, and impact on, the individual who is denied admission.
Such a decision should not be made lightly, and it should be made legitimately.
The current approach to character screening in Canada is insufficiently rigorous.
It incorporates too much of the historical concept of generic ethical character,
and does not focus sufficiently on the character requirement’s purpose, the
protection of the public. The published decisions fundamentally duck the real
issue: does this applicant present a greater risk to the public in the future, or not?
In this paper we have explored whether shifting the character requirement
unambiguously to the domain of psychological assessment would impose the
necessary level of rigour. In the abstract it might, and certainly if law societies
insist on retaining character screening there seems little justification for doing so
other than on the basis of some assessment of the applicant’s future conduct in
law. In practice, however, it appears doubtful whether this approach would serve
any useful purpose, and it has the potential to be quite unfair. Such predictions
cannot be made with any accuracy on an individual basis. As a consequence, it
is as likely as not that any given denial of admission will be unjust. If that is the
case, then the good character requirement should be abandoned.
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